快速看出投資市場的黑心假貨?一個簡單範例–JustWater (How to tell a lying and immoral company? A simple demo — JustWater)

JustWater這種騙假文青真無知的商品看得我笑意滿滿 XD

1. 利樂包是包上很多層塑膠(LDPE)與鋁箔的紙材,一點也不環保,而且比起傳統HDPE塑膠瓶來說,塑化劑甚至更容易溶出。

好笑的是,HDPE塑膠瓶非常容易回收,只要清洗乾淨、打碎、烘乾,幾乎就可直接進吹出成形機製作新塑膠產品。做過塑膠工廠就知道,市面上很容易買到這種回收塑料。

利樂包回收呢?多材質複合回收哪這麼容易呀!成本也高多了。

此外利樂包壓扁的體積,依然比打碎成顆粒的塑膠瓶大,說節省運輸空間根本是騙外行。

講白話就是:換成利樂包更不環保,也更不健康。只是騙對工業材料極端無知的蠢文青的行銷噱頭。

繼續閱讀 “快速看出投資市場的黑心假貨?一個簡單範例–JustWater (How to tell a lying and immoral company? A simple demo — JustWater)”

我對近日美股看法 (My thoughts on recent US stock markets.)

I would like to talk about three events that have been in progress for couple years.

1. The dark cloud on the immediate horizon is the Exchange-trade funds, which have grown exponentially in size in the past five years, but never been crucially examined by panicked selling. If the market turns around and the ETF investors decide to abandon their shares out of fear, ETFs would be forced to dump stocks and such behaviors could begin a vicious circle and drag the stock prices into a deeper valley.

And I believe the algorithmic or AI trading could deteriorate such situation.

2. The S&P 500 has reached 19 times of P/E ratio, higher than the historical average of about 15.

Readers might read my article on P/E ratio first— “談本益比觀念的對與錯 ”

I think the 19 times of P/E ratio is not the problem itself. It simply reflects the reality of extremely low interest rates for almost a decade. The artificial manipulation of interest rates can mislead the prices of time of the markets, distort the anticipates of incomes, and increase the information costs. Therefore, the interest rates are the causes and the high P/E ratio is nothing but the unavoidable effect. “Action and reaction,” as they said. 

You shall not explain facts by facts.


3. The low interest rates also have encouraged a lot of corporate-share-buyback plans by borrowing, which has been one of the factors boosted the stock prices in the past five years. And I wouldn’t say it is a healthy phenomenon, despite Warren Buffett’s preference.

All these factors imply that the intrinsic economic progress might be left behind the raising prices of the capital markets. The diversion of these two, the reality and the artificial finance system, is the major cause of most financial crises.

As I said in the last article, “榮景或低成長的十字路口 (We are at the crossroads of prosperity or low progress) ,” the monetary policy of Fed and the uncertain success of the economic reforms by President Donald Trump are two key factors in my prediction of the US economy and the performance of its stock markets. Once either one went wrong, the bear could show up all of a sudden.

PS.

1. There can be high settlement or bankruptcy risks for small or over-diversified ETFs in the bear markets. Although the investors can get back their shares of the real assets, it could be worthless after all. And such fear could induce investors and the ETF managers, who by doing so is breaking the contracts, to dump their holdings for money.

2. There can be even higher risks for leverage, inverse, or complex-designed derivative ETFs in a down turn. And I guess the bankruptcy administrators assigned by the courts would probably choose to sell the stocks or bonds and to cancel or abolish the complex derivative financial contracts for cash as soon as possible, which could cause the vicious circle as I mentioned in the article.

At present the ETFs go too far from the original purpose. For me, many of them are more like derivative goods rather than pure investing vehicles. It’s kind of new fashion for people of means. But we have no idea what would really happen when the tide is out. We can wait and see.

論比特幣(on Bitcoin)

比特幣(Bitcoin)是一種數位加密貨幣與支付系統,使用的關鍵技術/理論稱為「區塊鏈(blockchain)」,也是一種P2P支付系統,毋須經過任何中央管理者(如銀行、政府)即可完成交易。

根據發明人中本聰的演算法設計,全部的比特幣發行量會有個天然上限 — 約2100萬單位,目前已被挖出的量大概在1600多萬單位。

關於區塊鏈技術詳細內容,網路上很多文章都講解得很清楚,我就不贅言。

直接進入經濟分析:

首先我們要問比特幣到底是不是貨幣?還是如黃金一般,只是一種財富倉庫(wealth vault)?

如果比特幣是個貨幣,則以下幾個問題我們無法迴避:

1. 現今真實接受比特幣的交易行為佔總體交易行為來說,近乎微乎其微,比例非常低。
2. 即便放到非法交易,根據我讀到的資料,在類似絲路的網路毒品交易上,真正使用比特幣乃至於其他數位貨幣的比例依然不高;就算有人用,多半也在交易之後很快地換成美元、歐元等實體貨幣。

以上二點若以貨幣觀之,則比特幣沒什麼交易者接受的現況,此對其貨幣之定位十分不利。

再進一步看,如果比特幣是貨幣,那值得現在這麼高的匯率價位嗎?(目前最新匯價為1比特幣可兌換3939美元)

這讓我們回到經濟學的Fisher定律:

PQ = MV

物價 x 交易量 = 貨幣總發行量 x 貨幣週轉數

針對比特幣,4個變數其中3個我們可以確定:

貨幣總發行量我們已知,而貨幣實際週轉數相對主流實體貨幣不高,也是已知;承上所述,真實世界使用比特幣交易的交易量相對主流實體貨幣非常小,因此比特幣制度下的物價不可能高到哪去。

換言之,從Fisher公式我們可以斷言,目前比特幣的高匯價並非來自於貨幣本身的好處,而是來自於持有者把它當作是財富倉庫。

這就進入第二命題:比特幣適合當財富倉庫嗎?
繼續閱讀 “論比特幣(on Bitcoin)”

關於Amazon.com

在Amazon.com這個超級電商競爭之下,許多租值本就不高的傳統零售通路自然會大受影響。

但反過來,股票市場的過度反應,也讓很多租值其實很高的retails被過份低估。這就是價值投資的大好機會。

幾個點提供給大夥兒參考:

1. 根據經濟學邊際產量遞減定律,Amazon不可能橫掃所有零售業;事實上電商模式也不可能橫掃所有傳統零售業。這部份許多分析師的看法都違背了經濟學定律。

2. Amazon Go或阿里巴巴的無人商店從經濟分析角度上看,不會是一個成功的商業模式。甚至可以說是註定失敗的模式。

3. 經濟學也告訴我們,壟斷租值不可能透過在不考慮侷限條件下任意地透過垂直整合方式向上或下去延伸。

因此在我看來,Amazon買下Whole Food也是敗率高於勝率,特別是當Amazon宣布降低Whole Food產品售價時,我認為他們走錯方向了。

總而言之,一個累積財富的機會已然降臨,就看個人有無慧根與造化,這部份我就不說透了。

榮景或低成長的十字路口 (We are at the crossroads of prosperity or low progress)

In this article, I am trying to demonstrate how to use only the price theory, but not the traditional macro-economics, to forecast the future economy progress of the United States.

Here are three interesting numbers we should pay attention to:

1. The total credit-card balances grow $20B in the second quarter to $784B, highest record since the late 2009.

2. Overall debts — including mortgages, auto loans, and students loans– hit a record $12.8T.

3. Personal saving rate fell to 3.8% in Junes, down from a recent peak of 6.3% in Oct. 2015.

The raising of personal debts and reduction of savings means American are more eager to spend, which implies three possibilities:

A. the anticipated inflation rate increases, or;
B. the anticipated income grows, or;
C. the information cost of the future progress decreases.

The problem here is which factor weighs more over the others? If the factor A stands out, then, according to I. Fisher’s theory of the interest, the total wealth of the American will decrease. In a lucky situation, the Fed may sense it about six months later and stop raising the Fed Fund Rate to save the economy as it had done before. In a bad situation as the Fed blindly continuing raising the interest rate, we can predict a bear market coming for a while until the Fed realize the real situation. No matter which one happened, the recent economic expansion would not last for long.

If the factor B or C weighs more than the factor A, the total wealth will increase and the prosperity could be foreseen. There are two major causes to make it happen: one is the growth of productivity and the other is the decrease of transaction costs, including but not limited to the more friendly laws to businesses, over-haul lower tax burdens, and lower immigrant limits (including illegal Mexican immigrants).

Right now, I am confident in that the later two factors playing more important roles in the formation of the massively optimistic anticipation. But as long as the real improvement does not catch it up in time, the positive mood could dissipate quickly. It could cost a lot of energy and time to recall it back again. What a shame, president Trump!

Therefore, I believe that we are at the crossroads of the U.S. economy progress. In only couple months, we will figure out which path do we take.

The Roller-Coaster Ride in Energy Stocks Is Far from Over. — 2017/05/13

1. 石油價格在2016年鹹魚翻身,但到了2017年至今卻又滑落,遠遠落後股票市場表現。
2. 世界每日石油需求成長從2015年的1.8百萬桶衰退至2017年的1.3百萬桶。
3. Gavekal Capital的CEO Louis-Vincent Gave對短中期石油價格並不樂觀,理由如下:

a. 全世界都知道沙烏地阿拉伯想要抬轎石油價格,因為他們國家的巨大IPO計畫 — Saudi Aramco需要有堅強的石油價格支撐,才能有漂亮的籌資。

b. 回教世界遜尼派與什葉派的千年鬥爭,簡單地讓回教世界分邊站:一邊是沙烏地阿拉伯與卡達等國家,另一邊則是伊朗以及暗中支持的俄羅斯。

c. 沙烏地阿拉伯的IPO計畫,說穿了就是賣祖產籌資好應付長年戰爭與一直以來奢侈的福利國家政策。

d. 換言之,伊朗與俄羅斯有極高的誘因去壓低石油價格,好讓沙烏地阿拉伯IPO籌資不順。事實上俄羅斯也的確如此,該國每日石油產量已經拉高到破紀錄的11.5百萬桶!而當溫暖月份來臨時,這個產量還可能繼續提昇!

我的看法:

不得不再鞭一次危言聳聽的清大彭明輝教授。

2011年彭明輝的「「石油危機」是危言聳聽?http://mhperng.blogspot.tw/2011/11/blog-post_06.html#uds-search-results」一文宣稱石油危機來臨,全球GDP會下降,石油產能跟不上需求的增長…云云。

我在本blog多次撰文明白指出彭明輝宣稱的石油危機,乃至於糧食危機都是危言聳聽,毫無科學根據可言。

6年過去了,我們再次檢視,全球石油產量不但沒有跟不上需求,事實上從International Energy Agency的數據可以看出:

從2014年第二季以來,全球石油供給幾乎每季超過實際需求,於2015Q2甚至每日供給超過需求量2百萬桶!

2016年末以來的供給降低,完全是因為OPEC的人為減產,並非任何自然或人力不可控制因素造成。但大家也都知道,OPEC的減產努力幾乎要被俄羅斯的增產、美加的頁岩油的投入給弭平,OPEC希冀的減產效果遠不如預期,這點從油價來看最是客觀且無可辯駁。

彭明輝文中所宣稱的供需圖表根本與事實相距甚遠!

說過許多次了,彭明輝如果不懂經濟學這塊,就請勿誤人子弟。彭教授如果相信自己的危機論,那請拿出真金白銀與市場賭一手。

而真笨到相信彭教授的危機論而去投資作多糧食與石油的朋友,早賠到破產!我在此致哀。

延伸閱讀:
再回頭看「石油危機」這謬論 http://www.yuanyu.idv.tw/?p=1515
小麥價格創下10年來最低 http://www.yuanyu.idv.tw/?p=1609
MONEY IS MADE SLOWLY OVER A LONG TIME AND LOST IN A HURRY http://www.yuanyu.idv.tw/?p=1694

談「本益比(P/E)」觀念的對與錯

本益比本身是從報酬率的倒數來看投資機會成本,就基礎觀念來說是正確的。但實務運用上幾乎多數人(包含知名財經媒體、Information Service公司)都犯了錯而不自知。

正確的一面:當你把資金投入某個項目中,你的機會成本就是其他最高投資報酬率的選項。

以巴菲特的習慣來說,他喜歡用他主觀認為「近乎無風險」的美國10年或30年國債利率作為機會成本。實際運用上他是把這個利率作為「折現利率」,不懂折現觀念的人請自行在我的blog上搜尋「利息理論」。

股票報酬率一般會高過國債利率,中間還涵蓋了股票本身的不確定性所帶來的「風險貼水」。

錯誤的一面:

1. 本益比是報酬率的導數,計算上就是Price / Earning(簡稱P/E),通常財經媒體使用的P就是現在股價,但E卻是用去年每股淨利,這絕對是錯誤的!

懂利息理論就知道,所有的資產的現值應該是未來收入流的折現值總合,但通常媒體宣稱的本益比所使用的E並非「未來收入」,而是「過去收入」,這在經濟學上不但已經犯了重大錯誤,而且計算出來的數字是完全無意義的。

這個數字錯誤地假設,企業活動結果會跟去年一樣,但通常並不成立。

因此,要正確地使用「本益比」這個工具,你需要的並不是拿「過去盈餘」計算,而是要拿「未來盈餘」才對,也才符合經濟學邏輯。明眼人都看出來,未來盈餘才是大麻煩與功夫所在,因為預測未來盈餘絕非易事,之中存在非常鉅額的「訊息成本(information costs)」。而要提高預測未來盈餘正確性,根據我的經驗,一流的economic sense不可少。

這就說明了為什麼會計學博士、財務學博士投資股市績效往往不怎樣,因為二者都在過去數字打轉,在錯誤的方向上努力結果往往更糟。

這也說明了為什麼許多經濟學博士股市績效也很差,因為當今經濟學課本錯誤百出,加上許多經濟系教授乃至於博士其實economic sense非常差,純粹數學強,經濟邏輯常常錯誤連篇而不自知。

至於商學院那種訓練編故事能力的學問,又跟真正投資是八竿子打不著關係。

這更說明了像巴菲特這種對於企業活動未來預測準確性高的人,可以享有非常高的租值!(761億美元身價)

奉勸一句,如果朋友能有自知之明,清楚自己不是巴菲特這種料(可惜有自知之明的人太少),那朋友你還是乖乖投資ETF或指數型基金就好,市場是最殘酷的老師,自我欺騙與催眠對市場是無效的。

2.武斷地選擇本益比10、20、30或者不經思考地以過去與現在的本益比做比較。

上述錯誤觀點散見於諸多媒體乃至於號稱「股市大師」的論述中,但很可惜也錯得一塌糊塗。

共同錯誤在於這些人都忽略的,本益比既然是報酬率的倒數,真正有意義的比較對象應該是機會成本 — 也就是放棄的最高代價。如前述,巴菲特選擇美國國債利率作為機會成本來比較,這就是為什麼2017/2/27接受CNBC訪問時,會說現在美股沒有泡沫化,同時此時美股不算貴:

Quick: Although you have had times where you thought stocks were incredibly cheap, like in 2008, 2009, when you talked about that, even on our program. You thought that there were times that stocks were greatly overvalued where you’ve said, “Forget it, don’t do it.” Are we near an inflection point right now, as best as you can tell?

Buffett: Well … I’ve been talking this way for quite a while, ever since the fall of 2008. I was a little early on that actually. But I don’t think you could time it. And we are not in a bubble territory or anything of the sort. Now, if interest rates were 7 or 8 percent then these prices would look exceptionally high. But you have to measure, you know, you measure everything against: interest rates, basically, and interest rates act like gravity on valuation. So when interest rates were 15 percent in 1982 they’d pull down the value of any asset. So, what’s the sense of buying a farm on a 4 percent yield basis if you can get 15 percent in government’s? But measured against interest rates, stocks actually are on the cheap side compared to historic valuations. But the risk always is, is that — that interest rates go up a lot, and that brings stocks down. But I would say this, if the ten-year stays at 230, and they would stay there for ten years, you would regret very much not having bought stocks now.

此外巴菲特也提到道瓊指數在他11歲的時候只有100點,當時就充斥著「股市過熱」種種言論,後來過200點的時候也一樣,幾百點到幾千點,每天都有人主張股市過熱。巴菲特強調他不知道明天股市會怎樣,說不定會重挫20%,這在過去也不是沒發生過,但他認為只要美國經濟制度像過去幾十年一樣順利發展,未來道瓊指數過10萬點也不是什麼大事,一如回頭看他11歲時的道瓊。

Quick: Yeah, there are times, Warren, where you hear pundits or other people saying, “Look things are at risk at this point. Our American way of life, our system is under threat.” And I’ve heard this from all sides at all different times. Is there ever a point where you thought that was the case?

Buffett: No, and you say you’ve heard it at all times from all sides. I’ve been hearing it, you know, all my life. And in the spring of 1942 I was 11 years old, and the Dow was at about 100. And we were losing the war in the Pacific at that point, that was early … was shortly after Pearl Harbor. And there was no doubt in this country we were going to win over time. I mean, and people said, “Well, this is let’s wait till things are clear, let’s wait till we start winning the war.” There’s always a reason to wait and I’ve listened to that all my life. You know, when I got out of school the Dow had never been above 200. There’d never been a year when the Dow had not been below 200 during the year. Even in 1929, when it got to 381, the low was below 200. Never been a year. Well, so what, you know? But that was a big subject at that time. And then you know, we ran into price controls, we ran into the oil shocks, you name it, just all kinds of things. And those are diversions. So all my life I’ve been hearing, “You know, maybe there’s a better time to invest, you know?” Or, “Things are more unpredictable now.” They’re always unpredictable. I can’t predict what’s gonna happen tomorrow. I mean, you could have anything happen tomorrow. We’ve had October 19th, 1987, 22 percent down in one day. So I can predict what’ll happen ten or 20 years in a general way, but I have no idea what’ll happen tomorrow. And the important thing is if you got these wonderful assets out there, to own ’em, and which ones do you own? I mean, if you … if you save money you can buy bonds, you can buy a farm, you can buy an apartment, house, or even buy a part of American business. And if you buy a 10-year bond now you’re paying over 40 times earnings for something whose earnings can’t grow. And you know, you compare that to buying equities, good businesses, I don’t think there’s any comparison. But that doesn’t mean the stock market can’t go down 20 percent tomorrow. I mean, you never know what it’s going to do tomorrow, but you do know what it’s going to do over ten or 20 years. And people talk about 20,000 being high. Well, I remember when it hit 200 and that was supposedly high. The Dow, I mean, the Dow, in your lifetime. You know, you’re going to see a Dow that certainly approaches 100,000 and that doesn’t require any miracles, that just requires the American system continuing to function pretty much as it has.

題外話一句,我覺得台灣媒體很悲哀的是斷章取義、自行想像地亂下標題,例如:

財訊週刊 –「巴菲特:道瓊上看10萬點、別妄想拉回再買,蘋果看旺」

東森新聞 — 「股神94狂 巴菲特:美股最終會逼近10萬 」

鉅亨網 — 「巴菲特:維持零利率五十年道瓊上十萬點」

蘋果即時 — 「巴菲特:若Fed這麼做 美股早就上10萬點」

慢著,巴菲特有說”維持零利率50年道瓊上10萬點”這種話嗎?通篇訪談我都沒看到,這些記者不知道是用A眼、B眼還是P眼看到的?

他明明是說:「…you’re going to see a Dow that certainly approaches 100,000 and that doesn’t require any miracles, that just requires the American system continuing to function pretty much as it has.

這邊我要特別點一下,就是巴菲特所依據的利率並不完全是純粹市場利率,而是經過美國Fed人為操作後的利率。而美國用操控利率來達到貨幣與經濟政策,這從經濟學上是個大敗筆,以後有空再多談。

回到本益比這個主題。

很明顯巴菲特也是正確的經濟學機會成本觀念在看本益比,目前股價是否過高,比較的是現今利率環境,而非任何一個武斷的、經驗的數字。我們因此也就知道,股市究竟上幾萬點、幾千萬點,這個訊息本身是沒有任何意義的,自然也無從得知股價是否過高、股市是否過熱。

3. 盈餘成長的公司,本益比永遠不會過高;盈餘衰退的公司,本益比永遠過高!

既然盈餘是要看未來,假設有間公司每股盈餘(EPS)今年是10,明年後年年都會是500(姑且假設發生機率是100%),則現在300元股價,本益比究竟是偏高還是低?

反之,今年EPS是10,明年後會衰退到年年都是0.01,現在50元股價是高還是低?

最後這個極端例子,綜合第一點與第二點,對投資有興趣的朋友好好想想,就不會再被有關本益比諸多似是而非的謬論迷惑了。

Now we can all see the trade of the decade — 2016/12/31

Now we can all see the trade of the decade — 2016/12/31

Hindsight Capital beats rivals and the market every year. But how did it do over 10 years?

1. Money is made slowly over a long time and lost in a hurry.

2. 2007 – 2016 S&P500 績效為 97%;

Russell 2000為98%;

原油為 -75%;

上海A股(經歷兩次崩盤)為86.7%;

MSCI全球指數為7.8%;

歐洲FTSE Eurofirst 300為6.3%;

新興市場指數為19%。

希臘為 -97.2%

葡萄牙為 -70%

愛爾蘭為 -68.6%

義大利為 -64.5%
西班牙
為 -46.3%

3. 這十年來不斷被炒作的新興市場,其實報酬率遠不如宣傳。

4. 清大彭明輝這十年來不斷宣稱能源危機、食物危機,如果真有年輕人相信他的跑去作多石油,現在早就幾乎賠光身家財產(虧損97.2%),投資1000萬只剩2萬多。



是的,石油遲早有用完的一天,但是目前人類已知的石油蘊藏量(這個數字從過去就一直不斷增加,1993年時人類以為總石油蘊藏量約為1兆桶,2013年修正為1.688兆桶)除以每日使用量(約96.3百萬桶),光是原油就還能使用48年才耗盡。這還不包括天然氣以及後來發現蘊藏量可能更大的油頁岩。目前已知的頁岩油蘊藏量就有0.34兆桶。而頁岩油生產成本不斷降低,不少廠商在每桶40美元以下就已經能損益兩平。 



加上市場供需力量本身會以價格作為調和,當石油價格攀上天價時,人們自然會減少石油使用,同時可替代石油的能源方案也會變得有利可圖而使得供給方出現。單純假設人類不管價格侷限卻一昧越用越多絕對是錯誤的。

因此在半世紀內要看到能源危機的可能性微乎其微。

但看到彭明輝因為宣稱憂國憂民與炒作能源危機、糧食危機而又出書又到處演講進而名利雙收,倒是確定的。



我看Virtaul Reality

從華爾街日報一篇文章談起。

WSJ — “Why the virtual-reality hype is about to come crashing down.”

雖然說媒體與部分人士近日大力炒作VR,但是如同該文作者Christohper Mims所言:「In my experience, VR demos can be very impressive. The problem is that most are just that— demos.」

VR內容供給非常少,而其內容多半也很淺薄。

作者特別以早期電視發明者RCA為例,為了賣電視RCA還成立的NBC(美國第一家電視台)來創造買電視的誘因。其實1980年代SONY也有感於錄影帶規格大戰敗因就是輸在內容太少,還特地買下一家電影公司(雖然說綜效到現在也沒多好就是啦~)。我認為,或許當年SONY應該多買幾家A片公司來得更實惠有效– 要知道HD DVD與Blueray的格式大戰可是靠A片公司選邊站發揮效果!

但是VR呢?現階段我們真的看不太到有什麼突破性的內容。Facebook說要提供$1千萬美金、HTC說要提供$1億美金來激勵VR內容創作,但其實都太少太少。而大家似乎又都忘了最重要的A片內容產業…

華爾街日報作者甚至認為 VR所宣傳的360 video不過會淪為下一個3-D電視 — 沒人要求電視有這個功能,而且也沒什麼人在用。

就VR遊戲,我認為VR根本就是「近視製造機」,對家長來說要認同有非常大的困難。換言之,小的不准玩,大的只會是部分未當父母的少數成年人,而且不過是手上的眾多玩具之一而已。但初期硬體效能不彰的問題絕對是如影隨形地影響消費意願。

至於VR在導覽或銷售等商業用途加分這點,我認為效果近乎為零。假的場景或3D圖像,不可能消弭消費者心中的疑慮,甚至只會增加資訊成本。畢竟沒人會明知道是電腦動畫而選擇被騙的,消費決策跟看電影是兩回事。

去年我的投資主軸就是放空宏達電。今年1月以來改做多石油與原物料,但長期我依然看空宏達電。我不相信宏達電的VR願景,更不相信王雪紅的為人。

看財經雜誌買股票的下場

Fortune雜誌,算是財經雜誌中比較有名氣的,隸屬Time Magazine旗下。

這份雜誌在2000年8月號曾有一篇文章「10 Stocks To Last The Decade (未來10年就靠這10支股票!)」,還有個副標題:

「A few major trends will likely shape the next ten years. Here’s a buy-and-forget portfolio to capitalize on them.(能改變下個十年的幾個重大趨勢;買了放著就能獲利的投資組合。)」

這篇文章列出的投資名單如下:

  • Broadcom
  • Charles Schwab
  • ENRON
  • Genentech
  • Morgan Stanley
  • Nokia
  • Nortel Network
  • Oracle
  • Univision
  • Viacom
  • 洋洋灑灑,果然氣勢不凡!涵蓋內容產業、生物科技、能源公司、手機王者…到最夯的投資銀行,幾乎2000年最熱門的、看似最有競爭力的都在上面了!

    事隔將近12年,我們回顧Fortune專家們開出的這份名單,假設我當年每家公司都投資1千美元,共1萬美元。其投資績效如下:

    12年前若有人遵照Fortune名牌專家的建議,1萬美元的投資,如今只剩下4千7百多美元,績效是損失52.29%。

    不過我還是有兩個好消息給這位仁兄欣慰一番:1.我的計算並未計入股利分配,所以他的損失”稍微”沒有那麼嚴重(不過我也沒有計算通貨膨脹,所以好像依然不太妙); 2.在2002年時,他損失高達80%,現在情況已經改善很多了呢!