我對近日美股看法 (My thoughts on recent US stock markets.)

I would like to talk about three events that have been in progress for couple years.

1. The dark cloud on the immediate horizon is the Exchange-trade funds, which have grown exponentially in size in the past five years, but never been crucially examined by panicked selling. If the market turns around and the ETF investors decide to abandon their shares out of fear, ETFs would be forced to dump stocks and such behaviors could begin a vicious circle and drag the stock prices into a deeper valley.

And I believe the algorithmic or AI trading could deteriorate such situation.

2. The S&P 500 has reached 19 times of P/E ratio, higher than the historical average of about 15.

Readers might read my article on P/E ratio first— “談本益比觀念的對與錯 ”

I think the 19 times of P/E ratio is not the problem itself. It simply reflects the reality of extremely low interest rates for almost a decade. The artificial manipulation of interest rates can mislead the prices of time of the markets, distort the anticipates of incomes, and increase the information costs. Therefore, the interest rates are the causes and the high P/E ratio is nothing but the unavoidable effect. “Action and reaction,” as they said. 

You shall not explain facts by facts.

3. The low interest rates also have encouraged a lot of corporate-share-buyback plans by borrowing, which has been one of the factors boosted the stock prices in the past five years. And I wouldn’t say it is a healthy phenomenon, despite Warren Buffett’s preference.

All these factors imply that the intrinsic economic progress might be left behind the raising prices of the capital markets. The diversion of these two, the reality and the artificial finance system, is the major cause of most financial crises.

As I said in the last article, “榮景或低成長的十字路口 (We are at the crossroads of prosperity or low progress) ,” the monetary policy of Fed and the uncertain success of the economic reforms by President Donald Trump are two key factors in my prediction of the US economy and the performance of its stock markets. Once either one went wrong, the bear could show up all of a sudden.


1. There can be high settlement or bankruptcy risks for small or over-diversified ETFs in the bear markets. Although the investors can get back their shares of the real assets, it could be worthless after all. And such fear could induce investors and the ETF managers, who by doing so is breaking the contracts, to dump their holdings for money.

2. There can be even higher risks for leverage, inverse, or complex-designed derivative ETFs in a down turn. And I guess the bankruptcy administrators assigned by the courts would probably choose to sell the stocks or bonds and to cancel or abolish the complex derivative financial contracts for cash as soon as possible, which could cause the vicious circle as I mentioned in the article.

At present the ETFs go too far from the original purpose. For me, many of them are more like derivative goods rather than pure investing vehicles. It’s kind of new fashion for people of means. But we have no idea what would really happen when the tide is out. We can wait and see.

論比特幣(on Bitcoin)


根據發明人中本聰的演算法設計,全部的比特幣發行量會有個天然上限 — 約2100萬單位,目前已被挖出的量大概在1600多萬單位。



首先我們要問比特幣到底是不是貨幣?還是如黃金一般,只是一種財富倉庫(wealth vault)?


1. 現今真實接受比特幣的交易行為佔總體交易行為來說,近乎微乎其微,比例非常低。
2. 即便放到非法交易,根據我讀到的資料,在類似絲路的網路毒品交易上,真正使用比特幣乃至於其他數位貨幣的比例依然不高;就算有人用,多半也在交易之後很快地換成美元、歐元等實體貨幣。





物價 x 交易量 = 貨幣總發行量 x 貨幣週轉數




繼續閱讀 “論比特幣(on Bitcoin)”





1. 根據經濟學邊際產量遞減定律,Amazon不可能橫掃所有零售業;事實上電商模式也不可能橫掃所有傳統零售業。這部份許多分析師的看法都違背了經濟學定律。

2. Amazon Go或阿里巴巴的無人商店從經濟分析角度上看,不會是一個成功的商業模式。甚至可以說是註定失敗的模式。

3. 經濟學也告訴我們,壟斷租值不可能透過在不考慮侷限條件下任意地透過垂直整合方式向上或下去延伸。

因此在我看來,Amazon買下Whole Food也是敗率高於勝率,特別是當Amazon宣布降低Whole Food產品售價時,我認為他們走錯方向了。


榮景或低成長的十字路口 (We are at the crossroads of prosperity or low progress)

In this article, I am trying to demonstrate how to use only the price theory, but not the traditional macro-economics, to forecast the future economy progress of the United States.

Here are three interesting numbers we should pay attention to:

1. The total credit-card balances grow $20B in the second quarter to $784B, highest record since the late 2009.

2. Overall debts — including mortgages, auto loans, and students loans– hit a record $12.8T.

3. Personal saving rate fell to 3.8% in Junes, down from a recent peak of 6.3% in Oct. 2015.

The raising of personal debts and reduction of savings means American are more eager to spend, which implies three possibilities:

A. the anticipated inflation rate increases, or;
B. the anticipated income grows, or;
C. the information cost of the future progress decreases.

The problem here is which factor weighs more over the others? If the factor A stands out, then, according to I. Fisher’s theory of the interest, the total wealth of the American will decrease. In a lucky situation, the Fed may sense it about six months later and stop raising the Fed Fund Rate to save the economy as it had done before. In a bad situation as the Fed blindly continuing raising the interest rate, we can predict a bear market coming for a while until the Fed realize the real situation. No matter which one happened, the recent economic expansion would not last for long.

If the factor B or C weighs more than the factor A, the total wealth will increase and the prosperity could be foreseen. There are two major causes to make it happen: one is the growth of productivity and the other is the decrease of transaction costs, including but not limited to the more friendly laws to businesses, over-haul lower tax burdens, and lower immigrant limits (including illegal Mexican immigrants).

Right now, I am confident in that the later two factors playing more important roles in the formation of the massively optimistic anticipation. But as long as the real improvement does not catch it up in time, the positive mood could dissipate quickly. It could cost a lot of energy and time to recall it back again. What a shame, president Trump!

Therefore, I believe that we are at the crossroads of the U.S. economy progress. In only couple months, we will figure out which path do we take.

The Roller-Coaster Ride in Energy Stocks Is Far from Over. — 2017/05/13

1. 石油價格在2016年鹹魚翻身,但到了2017年至今卻又滑落,遠遠落後股票市場表現。
2. 世界每日石油需求成長從2015年的1.8百萬桶衰退至2017年的1.3百萬桶。
3. Gavekal Capital的CEO Louis-Vincent Gave對短中期石油價格並不樂觀,理由如下:

a. 全世界都知道沙烏地阿拉伯想要抬轎石油價格,因為他們國家的巨大IPO計畫 — Saudi Aramco需要有堅強的石油價格支撐,才能有漂亮的籌資。

b. 回教世界遜尼派與什葉派的千年鬥爭,簡單地讓回教世界分邊站:一邊是沙烏地阿拉伯與卡達等國家,另一邊則是伊朗以及暗中支持的俄羅斯。

c. 沙烏地阿拉伯的IPO計畫,說穿了就是賣祖產籌資好應付長年戰爭與一直以來奢侈的福利國家政策。

d. 換言之,伊朗與俄羅斯有極高的誘因去壓低石油價格,好讓沙烏地阿拉伯IPO籌資不順。事實上俄羅斯也的確如此,該國每日石油產量已經拉高到破紀錄的11.5百萬桶!而當溫暖月份來臨時,這個產量還可能繼續提昇!





6年過去了,我們再次檢視,全球石油產量不但沒有跟不上需求,事實上從International Energy Agency的數據可以看出:






再回頭看「石油危機」這謬論 http://www.yuanyu.idv.tw/?p=1515
小麥價格創下10年來最低 http://www.yuanyu.idv.tw/?p=1609
MONEY IS MADE SLOWLY OVER A LONG TIME AND LOST IN A HURRY http://www.yuanyu.idv.tw/?p=1694


本益比本身是從報酬率的倒數來看投資機會成本,就基礎觀念來說是正確的。但實務運用上幾乎多數人(包含知名財經媒體、Information Service公司)都犯了錯而不自知。





1. 本益比是報酬率的導數,計算上就是Price / Earning(簡稱P/E),通常財經媒體使用的P就是現在股價,但E卻是用去年每股淨利,這絕對是錯誤的!



因此,要正確地使用「本益比」這個工具,你需要的並不是拿「過去盈餘」計算,而是要拿「未來盈餘」才對,也才符合經濟學邏輯。明眼人都看出來,未來盈餘才是大麻煩與功夫所在,因為預測未來盈餘絕非易事,之中存在非常鉅額的「訊息成本(information costs)」。而要提高預測未來盈餘正確性,根據我的經驗,一流的economic sense不可少。


這也說明了為什麼許多經濟學博士股市績效也很差,因為當今經濟學課本錯誤百出,加上許多經濟系教授乃至於博士其實economic sense非常差,純粹數學強,經濟邏輯常常錯誤連篇而不自知。






共同錯誤在於這些人都忽略的,本益比既然是報酬率的倒數,真正有意義的比較對象應該是機會成本 — 也就是放棄的最高代價。如前述,巴菲特選擇美國國債利率作為機會成本來比較,這就是為什麼2017/2/27接受CNBC訪問時,會說現在美股沒有泡沫化,同時此時美股不算貴:

Quick: Although you have had times where you thought stocks were incredibly cheap, like in 2008, 2009, when you talked about that, even on our program. You thought that there were times that stocks were greatly overvalued where you’ve said, “Forget it, don’t do it.” Are we near an inflection point right now, as best as you can tell?

Buffett: Well … I’ve been talking this way for quite a while, ever since the fall of 2008. I was a little early on that actually. But I don’t think you could time it. And we are not in a bubble territory or anything of the sort. Now, if interest rates were 7 or 8 percent then these prices would look exceptionally high. But you have to measure, you know, you measure everything against: interest rates, basically, and interest rates act like gravity on valuation. So when interest rates were 15 percent in 1982 they’d pull down the value of any asset. So, what’s the sense of buying a farm on a 4 percent yield basis if you can get 15 percent in government’s? But measured against interest rates, stocks actually are on the cheap side compared to historic valuations. But the risk always is, is that — that interest rates go up a lot, and that brings stocks down. But I would say this, if the ten-year stays at 230, and they would stay there for ten years, you would regret very much not having bought stocks now.


Quick: Yeah, there are times, Warren, where you hear pundits or other people saying, “Look things are at risk at this point. Our American way of life, our system is under threat.” And I’ve heard this from all sides at all different times. Is there ever a point where you thought that was the case?

Buffett: No, and you say you’ve heard it at all times from all sides. I’ve been hearing it, you know, all my life. And in the spring of 1942 I was 11 years old, and the Dow was at about 100. And we were losing the war in the Pacific at that point, that was early … was shortly after Pearl Harbor. And there was no doubt in this country we were going to win over time. I mean, and people said, “Well, this is let’s wait till things are clear, let’s wait till we start winning the war.” There’s always a reason to wait and I’ve listened to that all my life. You know, when I got out of school the Dow had never been above 200. There’d never been a year when the Dow had not been below 200 during the year. Even in 1929, when it got to 381, the low was below 200. Never been a year. Well, so what, you know? But that was a big subject at that time. And then you know, we ran into price controls, we ran into the oil shocks, you name it, just all kinds of things. And those are diversions. So all my life I’ve been hearing, “You know, maybe there’s a better time to invest, you know?” Or, “Things are more unpredictable now.” They’re always unpredictable. I can’t predict what’s gonna happen tomorrow. I mean, you could have anything happen tomorrow. We’ve had October 19th, 1987, 22 percent down in one day. So I can predict what’ll happen ten or 20 years in a general way, but I have no idea what’ll happen tomorrow. And the important thing is if you got these wonderful assets out there, to own ’em, and which ones do you own? I mean, if you … if you save money you can buy bonds, you can buy a farm, you can buy an apartment, house, or even buy a part of American business. And if you buy a 10-year bond now you’re paying over 40 times earnings for something whose earnings can’t grow. And you know, you compare that to buying equities, good businesses, I don’t think there’s any comparison. But that doesn’t mean the stock market can’t go down 20 percent tomorrow. I mean, you never know what it’s going to do tomorrow, but you do know what it’s going to do over ten or 20 years. And people talk about 20,000 being high. Well, I remember when it hit 200 and that was supposedly high. The Dow, I mean, the Dow, in your lifetime. You know, you’re going to see a Dow that certainly approaches 100,000 and that doesn’t require any miracles, that just requires the American system continuing to function pretty much as it has.


財訊週刊 –「巴菲特:道瓊上看10萬點、別妄想拉回再買,蘋果看旺」

東森新聞 — 「股神94狂 巴菲特:美股最終會逼近10萬 」

鉅亨網 — 「巴菲特:維持零利率五十年道瓊上十萬點」

蘋果即時 — 「巴菲特:若Fed這麼做 美股早就上10萬點」


他明明是說:「…you’re going to see a Dow that certainly approaches 100,000 and that doesn’t require any miracles, that just requires the American system continuing to function pretty much as it has.




3. 盈餘成長的公司,本益比永遠不會過高;盈餘衰退的公司,本益比永遠過高!




Now we can all see the trade of the decade — 2016/12/31

Now we can all see the trade of the decade — 2016/12/31

Hindsight Capital beats rivals and the market every year. But how did it do over 10 years?

1. Money is made slowly over a long time and lost in a hurry.

2. 2007 – 2016 S&P500 績效為 97%;

Russell 2000為98%;

原油為 -75%;



歐洲FTSE Eurofirst 300為6.3%;


希臘為 -97.2%

葡萄牙為 -70%

愛爾蘭為 -68.6%

義大利為 -64.5%
為 -46.3%

3. 這十年來不斷被炒作的新興市場,其實報酬率遠不如宣傳。

4. 清大彭明輝這十年來不斷宣稱能源危機、食物危機,如果真有年輕人相信他的跑去作多石油,現在早就幾乎賠光身家財產(虧損97.2%),投資1000萬只剩2萬多。





我看Virtaul Reality


WSJ — “Why the virtual-reality hype is about to come crashing down.”

雖然說媒體與部分人士近日大力炒作VR,但是如同該文作者Christohper Mims所言:「In my experience, VR demos can be very impressive. The problem is that most are just that— demos.」


作者特別以早期電視發明者RCA為例,為了賣電視RCA還成立的NBC(美國第一家電視台)來創造買電視的誘因。其實1980年代SONY也有感於錄影帶規格大戰敗因就是輸在內容太少,還特地買下一家電影公司(雖然說綜效到現在也沒多好就是啦~)。我認為,或許當年SONY應該多買幾家A片公司來得更實惠有效– 要知道HD DVD與Blueray的格式大戰可是靠A片公司選邊站發揮效果!


華爾街日報作者甚至認為 VR所宣傳的360 video不過會淪為下一個3-D電視 — 沒人要求電視有這個功能,而且也沒什麼人在用。





Fortune雜誌,算是財經雜誌中比較有名氣的,隸屬Time Magazine旗下。

這份雜誌在2000年8月號曾有一篇文章「10 Stocks To Last The Decade (未來10年就靠這10支股票!)」,還有個副標題:

「A few major trends will likely shape the next ten years. Here’s a buy-and-forget portfolio to capitalize on them.(能改變下個十年的幾個重大趨勢;買了放著就能獲利的投資組合。)」


  • Broadcom
  • Charles Schwab
  • Genentech
  • Morgan Stanley
  • Nokia
  • Nortel Network
  • Oracle
  • Univision
  • Viacom
  • 洋洋灑灑,果然氣勢不凡!涵蓋內容產業、生物科技、能源公司、手機王者…到最夯的投資銀行,幾乎2000年最熱門的、看似最有競爭力的都在上面了!



    不過我還是有兩個好消息給這位仁兄欣慰一番:1.我的計算並未計入股利分配,所以他的損失”稍微”沒有那麼嚴重(不過我也沒有計算通貨膨脹,所以好像依然不太妙); 2.在2002年時,他損失高達80%,現在情況已經改善很多了呢!








    1. 賺錢課稅,但是賠錢政府卻不補償

    資本利得(Capital Gain)看似不勞而穫,實質是應有報酬加上風險回報所形成。投資可能獲利,也可能虧損,這是基本常識。但劉憶如貴為芝加哥大學經濟學博士,卻似乎渾然不知。


    對照台灣農民每遇天災就能享有政府補助,甚至不種田也有休耕補助,台灣政府對待活絡資本市場的投資人和對待僅佔台灣GDP 1.54%的農業,態度還真是大不同!讓人看清這個馬政府眼中只有選票,沒有頭腦的算盤,也不禁懷疑憲法第七條「中華民國人民,無分男女、宗教、種族、階級、黨派,在法律上一律平等。」的真實性!



    2. 雙重課稅






    繼續閱讀 “反對政府課徵資本利得稅”