「…在川普的第一個任期內,庫克學會了通過給總統一個好的頭條新聞來贏得他的支持。2018年,蘋果承諾在五年內向美國投資3,500億美元——據知情人士透露,這主要是公司已經計劃的支出。庫克在今年8月再次使用了這個策略,他在橢圓形辦公室宣布將蘋果承諾的美國投資增加到四年內6,000億美元,並送給川普一塊金底座的牌匾。知情人士說,庫克幾乎沒有做出讓步,承諾主要是已經計劃的投資。川普隨後宣布蘋果將免於進口電子產品關稅,只需承擔較小的中國關稅,川普週四同意將其減半。… ("During Trump’s first term, Cook learned he can win over the president by giving him a good headline. In 2018, Apple promised to invest $350 billion in the U.S. over five years—primarily spending the company was already planning to make, say people familiar with the calculations." …."So Cook deployed the strategy again. In August, Cook said he was increasing Apple’s promised U.S. investments to $600 billion over four years. He made the announcement next to Trump in the Oval Office, as he gave him a plaque with a base of gold. Again, Cook gave up little, making promises primarily on already planned investment, said the people familiar with the figures."…."After the U.S. investment pledge, Trump announced Apple would be exempt from a tariff on imported electronics, leaving the company subject to only a smaller China tariff, which Trump agreed to cut in half on Thursday.")」
「…但現任和前任員工表示,蘋果的供應鏈永遠不會以任何實質性的方式回到美國("But Apple’s supply chain is never coming back to the U.S., not in any substantial way, current and former employees say.)」
結合本篇報導闡述Apple Tim Cook怎麼忽悠川普(其實我認為川普就算知道也樂於被如此忽悠,因為他要的是選舉,而不是真的要解決問題)。我們可以發現歐式或美式民主制度下,政客的訴求從來不是真實解決問題;此外,政客樂於人為創造問題、創造困難。因此這也會是我們分析中美競爭大框架下,非常重要的一個認知儲備。
「美國戰略家們設想,通過關稅壓縮中國的出口,鼓勵中國尋找新的國內增長點,或許通過改革其醫療和社會福利體系,讓消費者多消費、少儲蓄。通過施壓北京增加消費,中國將開始從美國和其他國家購買更多商品,其貿易順差將縮小,美國企業和農民也能夠開拓一個無與倫比的消費者市場。(U.S. strategists imagined that tariffs would squeeze exports and encourage China to find new sources of growth at home, perhaps by overhauling its health and social welfare systems to allow consumers to spend more and save less. By pressuring Beijing to boost consumption, the idea went, China would start buying more goods from the U.S. and the rest of the world, its trade surplus would shrink and U.S. businesses and farmers could tap a consumer market of unparalleled potential.)」
Today we’re talking about a country that is both our neighbor and our rival—India. News of Modi’s upcoming visit to China has drawn quite a bit of attention in both countries, but behind it lies decades of grievances and entanglements in China–India relations. Today, we’ll take a closer look at India’s foreign strategy, its historical baggage, and why I say India is a “credit-bankrupt” country. It’s now confirmed that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit China from August 31 to September 1 to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. In India, this has been heavily publicized, but the motives behind it are telling. It turns out Trump has recently stopped giving India face. He’s demanded that India stop buying Russian oil and even threatened to slap tariffs of 25% or 50% on Indian goods—a major blow to India’s economy.