“China manufacturing is ramping up and many customers are calling on FedEx aircraft to bring in fresh inventory. The cancellation of European passenger flights to the US has cut out a lot of cargo capacity, helping FedEx planes to fill up. Also, the US Ground business is growing as large retailers are fielding an increase of online orders. But Susquehanna thinks this could be short lived"
「…a. 本次股市大跌我認為是「貨幣幻覺」的修正,而非實體經濟的制度安排或生產力遭受破壞。 是的,我依然認為COVID-19壓抑了經濟活動,但尚未造成實質性破壞。此病毒本身造成的死亡與傳染狀況,其實都還不如H1N1。許多撐不下去的邊際型企業,多半在疫情爆發之前的體質就已經不佳。這種風落損失的確會淘汰不少這類企業,可是以整體全球經濟活力角度觀之,恆久收入預期改變還不大。 某些不入流的財經專家以為美國面臨經濟危機、即將陷入長期經濟衰退等等看法,我均當做是「看走眼賠太多錢所以被嚇傻的言論」。 b. 然而,媒體販賣恐懼的過度炒作與政府的過度防疫舉措等等的經濟損失仍難以衡量。會不會因此造成恆久收入預期改變?我認為可能性不低。六月底再回頭檢視吧。 c. 印鈔救市,美國本質制度性問題不改,當然成效會有2008年以來的邊際效應遞減問題,同時也極有可能產生「經濟蜂窩性組織炎」的金包銀現象。是我等投資者不可不慎的思考點。 川普年底選情轉壞,亦或美元轉弱勢(見圖),都可能讓美國政府重新在中東或世界某處引發戰爭衝突。但對美國經濟本身而言依然是弊大於利。」(為何此次崩盤黃金也跟著跌?黃金不是避險工具嗎?–3/17)
這是經濟學價格理論的基礎應用:若市場無從以價格調整應付新的侷限條件變化,則unemployment必然發生,於人是大規模失業、於物是滯銷、於資金則是爛頭寸。經濟學大師A. A. Alchian在1969年的論文「 Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment」說得很清楚。
4. 華爾街日報3/15社論針對Fed緊急救市方案關於短期現金市場注資這點,也是抱持肯定態度:「…The best Fed decisions in this regard are its expanded liquidity provisions. This includes an enhanced dollar-swap facility in coordination with six other major central banks around the world. It also reduced the price on the dollar-swap rate by 25 basis points to encourage other banks to use the facility. The rush to the safety of dollar assets in this time of uncertainty has created a shortage of dollars in some parts of the world, and this will help other central banks fill that financial need. …
The Fed also expanded its access to the discount window, which is the classic vehicle for providing liquidity to banks under stress. The Fed made an explicit point of encouraging banks to use the window, no doubt to reduce the stigma that some counterparties attach to banks that use it. The Fed reduced the “penalty rate”for using the window to 0.25%, which is almost no penalty at all.」
5. 談一點對前景的看法: a. 本次股市大跌我認為是「貨幣幻覺」的修正,而非實體經濟的制度安排或生產力遭受破壞。
d. 這幾天我等價值投資者應該是興奮且快樂得難以入眠,誠如巴菲特在2016年股東信所說:「“When downpours of that sort occur, it’s imperative that we rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons. And that we will do.”(當天空下起黃金雨,緊急措施應該是抓個大洗衣盆而不是小茶匙衝入雨中。我們就會這麼做。)」
謹祝各位順利把握難得的財富移轉機會。
補充,就在本文刊出的一小時內,聯準會又緊急宣布成立「Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)」,主要就是針對前文我提出的「短期現金流動性不足」的狀況。 可見此問題嚴重性與緊急性。 “The CPFF will provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that will purchase unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper rated A1/P1 (as of March 17, 2020) directly from eligible companies. …The Treasury will provide $10 billion of credit protection to the Federal Reserve in connection with the CPFF from the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF). The Federal Reserve will then provide financing to the SPV under the CPFF. Its loans will be secured by all of the assets of the SPV."
第一任總統華盛頓束手無策,時任國務卿Thomas Jefferson,這位始終主張「小農立國」的建國賢人則喜孜孜去信友人:「黃熱病可以有效阻止國家被有害於人類道德、健康與自由的城市塞滿!( “The yellow fever will discourage the growth of cities in our nation,” he wrote a friend, “& I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man.” )」
當年的醫生不知道傳染途徑是蚊子,而錯誤地怪罪於沼氣。要等到一百年後Dr. Walter Reed才找出罪魁禍首。
10. ETF會是大問題,這我在2017年10月的文章已經提到: 「1. There can be high settlement or bankruptcy risks for small or over-diversified ETFs in the bear markets. Although the investors can get back their shares of the real assets, it could be worthless after all. And such fear could induce investors and the ETF managers, who by doing so is breaking the contracts, to dump their holdings for money. 2. There can be even higher risks for leverage, inverse, or complex-designed derivative ETFs in a down turn. And I guess the bankruptcy administrators assigned by the courts would probably choose to sell the stocks or bonds and to cancel or abolish the complex derivative financial contracts for cash as soon as possible, which could cause the vicious circle as I mentioned in the article. At present the ETFs go too far from the original purpose. For me, many of them are more like derivative goods rather than pure investing vehicles. It’s kind of new fashion for people of means. But we have no idea what would really happen when the tide is out. We can wait and see.」
每次股災崩盤我們很常看到這類統計,例如Barron’s 3/7這篇「When Will the Stock Market Recover? The Pain Isn’t Over.」:
「1929年以來,美國股市總共發生121次單日漲跌幅超過4.2%,而65個交易日後,股市終究是漲是跌的機率跟丟硬幣沒兩樣 — 50%隨後S&P500平均下跌14.5%;50%上漲18.1%。」 ( “The data back him up. Since 1929, there have been 121 one-day moves of 4.2% or more, according to John Kolovos, chief technical market strategist at Macro Risk Advisors—and in those instances, the chances of a positive return over the following 65 trading days were no better than a coin flip. Half of the time, the S&P 500 fell with an average drop of 14.5%. The other half, the S&P 500 gained an average of 18.1%.")
「A repo transaction is a short-term (usually overnight) collateralised loan, in which the borrower (of cash) sells a security (typically government bonds as collateral) to the lender, with a commitment to buy it back later at the same price plus interest. Repo markets redistribute liquidity between financial institutions: not only banks (as is the case with the federal funds market), but also insurance companies, asset managers, money market funds and other institutional investors. In so doing, they help other financial markets to function smoothly. Thus, any sustained disruption in this market, with daily turnover in the US market of about $1 trillion, could quickly ripple through the financial system. The freezing-up of repo markets in late 2008 was one of the most damaging aspects of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC).」
「避險基金在repo市場的現金需求操作吸乾了流通現金(Hedge funds exacerbated the recent turmoil in the repo market with their thirst for borrowing cash to juice up returns on their trades)…」
These REITs operated at leverages of around 9x through 2012 but incurred damage to capital after an interest rate jump from the “Bernanke shock" caused a fall in asset holdings in 2013. Providers of repo funding became cautious about extending credit to these REITs, which subsequently operated at a leverage of around 7x for some time. From 2H 2018, however, these REITs rapidly hiked leverage (Figure 17), and we think they and other types of leveraged funds absorbed a large amount of dollar funding in money markets, reflecting surging repo rates on 17 Sep 2019.